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tl1e Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

JOHNSON REAL ESTATE COMPANY,
formerly JOHNSON-PEAY REAL ESTATE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, and MILTON G. JOHNSON and MILDRED F. JOHNSON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.

CASE
NO. 9158

LeROY F. NIELSON and ORA ELIZABETH
NIELSON, husband and wife, and PEOPLES STATE BANK OF AMERICAN
FORK, a corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents filed suit against the Appellants LeRoy
F. Nielson and Ora Elizabeth Nielson, husband and wife,
alleging that the Respondents were owners of certain deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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scribed real estate situated, lying, and being in Utah County, Utah, described as follows:
Begimling at a point in a fence line on the South side of
a street which point is East along the Section Line
2.57 feet and South 37.34 feet from the North Quarter
Corner of Section 13, Township 5 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89° 19'
East along said street line 66.4 feet to the West side of
a street; thence South 0°24' West 615.65 feet along said
street line; thence North 89° 36' West 100.0 feet; thence
South 0°24' West 81.20 feet to a fence line; thence
South 89° 40' West along said fence line 233.00 feet to
a fence line; thence North oo 53' West along said fence
line 307.25 feet to the remnant of an old fence line heretofore referred to in doods of record as "the old field
fence;" thence North 87° 57' East along said old field
fence line 281.14 foot to a fence line; thence North 0° 43'
West 379.45 feet along said fence line to the point of
beginning. EXCEPTING THEREFROM that land conveyed to Darrell G. Hlansen and Leo H. Wootton by deed
recorded as Entry No. 2481, February 16, 1959, in the
Office of the Recorder of Utah County, Utah.
And in this connection alleged that they and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of said property
for more than twenty-five years under exclusive use and
occupancy, and that the property had been enclosed by a
fence and that they and their predecessors in interest had
paid all taxes levied against said property. The Respondents prayed for and requested an order quieting title to the
real estate (R. 3-4).
Appellants filed an answer and counter-claim in which
they denied the allegations of the Respondents and alleged
that they, the Respondents, were the owners of full fee
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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simple title in and to property described as follows:
Beginning at the Northeast corner of the Northwest
Quarter of Section 13, Township 5 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Meridian, thence running South to the old
field fence 7.25 chains, more or less, thence West along
said old fence 13.35 chains; thence North 27lj2 o West
along old bed of creek 8.20 chains, more or less, to the
Quarter Section Line; thence along said line East 17.00
chains to the place of beginning.
Appellants claimed that they and their predecessors n
interest had b€en in possession of the property for more
than fifty years under full and exclusive use and occupancy.
That the property was enclosed by a fence and that theRespondents :and their predecessors in interest had paid all
taxes levied against said property. The Respondents prayed
for judgment quieting title to the said real estate (R. 7-10).
After trial of the case, the loiWer court granted judgment to the Respondents as prayed for in Respondents' complaint (R. 19-21) (R. 27-28).
The· Appellants receive their title by a warranty deed
dated May 31, 1940, recorded in Utah County Recorder's
Office in book 35, page 590, ori date of May 9, 1940 (De"fendants' Exhibit No. 4, page 17).
The Respondents received their title and it doesn't eonflict, by a warranty deed dated September 5, 1957, recorded
in Utah County Recorder's Office, in book 757, page 167,
on date of September 10, 1957 (Defendants' Exhibit No.
4, page 42).
Up until Feibruary 16, 1959, in so far as the deeds of
record, there was not a conflict in the title line between Appellants and Respondents. On date of February 16, 1959, a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

deed was made and executed by the Respondents in favor
of Darrell G. Hansen and Leo H. Wootton which conflicted
with the record title of the Appellants. This deed was dated
February 16, 1959, and was recorded February 16, 1959,
in the office of the Utah Cotmty Recorder in book 803, page
458 (Defendants' Exhibit No. 4, page 43). Then on date
of March 4, 1959, the Respondents received a deed which
conflicted with the title record of the Appellants. This deed
was executed March 4, 1959, and was recorded March 4,
1959, in the office of the Utah County Recorder in book
806, page 64 (Defendants' Exhibit No. 4, page 44). This
deed represents the fundamental conflict between the Appellants and Respondents. The effect of the deed was to
place the claimed north boundary line of the Respondents
approximately eighty-eight feet farther north than any deed
of record that the Respondents had. The north line of the
property described in said deed extended north of the south
bowldary line of the Appellants and extended a distance of
approximately sixty feet north of the recorded south boundary line of the Appellants. The Respondents claimed that
they were entitled to this property by virtue of possession
for a period in excess of twenty-five years and by the payment of taxes. The Appellants claimed full fee simple title
to the property and that they had been in exclusive possession and had paid taxes. Respondents contended that there
had been an old fence line along the north side of the property which corresponded with the north line of the deed
which they received March 4, 1959 (Defendants' Exhibit
No.4, page 44).
Appellants contended that the fence line referred to by
the Respondents had never actually been a boundary fence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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but that it was a fence that had separated orchard land from
pasture land of the common owner and that said fence had
not been in place for a period in excess of 19 years. Appellants further contended that there had been a boundary
line fence between the parties and that said boundary line
fence had been located along a line which corresponded with
the south boundary line as set forth in Appellants' deed of
May 9, 1940 (Defendants' Exhibit No. 4, page 17).

APPELLANTS' POINTS
I

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THAT THE
EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE
FINDINGS OF F.AJCf AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND DECREE QUIETING TITLE.

ARGUMENT
I

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THAT THE
EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND DECREE QUIETING TITLE.
The Appellants submit that a review of the evidence
in this case and the law applicable thereto shows that judgment should have been granted in favor of the Appellants
and against the Respondents. First, let us take the testimony of the Respondents' own witnesses. The first witness for the Respondents was one Ornel Emmons, the same
person who made and executed a warranty deed to the Respondents on date of September 5, 1957, which deed was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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recorded in the office of the Utah Cormty Recorder on Sep:tem:ber 10, 1957, Book 757, page 167 (!Defendants' Exhibit
No. 4, page 42) and also is the same person who made and
executed a warranty deed two years later in favor of the
Respondents, said deed dated March 4, 1959, recorded in the
office of the Utah County Recorder on date of March 4,
1959, Book 806, page 64, which deed is the first deed to conflict of record with the Appellants' title (Defendants' Exhibit No. 4, page 44).

Mr. Ornel Emmons testified he bought the property April1, 1946 (Tr. D-7, Line 1). Respondents' attorney asked
Mr. Emmons to describe the condition of the fence at the time
he purchased it and he answered that it had two or three
bwbs strung through what posts were left, and that it was
up on some posts and laying on the ground on some others
(Tr. D-10, Line 15-20).
Omel Emmons further testified that all the posts were
not in, and that there was just a post now and then, and that
the wire was up on some and down on some, and that he
imagined there were at least six posts (Tr. D-11, Line 1-8).
The witness further referred to a fire that he had set
a couple of years ·before he had sold the land, which had
some effect on the fence (Tr. C-12, Lines 1-21).
Mr. Emmons certainly had an interest in the case. He
had given the Respondents a warranty deed as late as March
4, 1959, which for the first time conflicted with the record
title of the A~llants.

The witness, Omel Emmons, on cross examination by
the Appellants in speaking of the number of posts in the
fence, stated four to six posts, (Tr. 13, Line 17), and he further testified to observing two posts that were a rod south
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of the posts he had mentioned (Tr. C-13, Line 17-27).
The witness, Orne! Emmons, also testified that the wires
were laying on the ground in places and that it wasn't the
type of fence that would hold anything from going back
and forth across the fence (Tr. C-15, Line 7-21).
He further testified that it wouldn't hold stock and that
it wouldn't even keep a tractor out (Tr. C-15, Line 22-26).
Mr. Orne! Emmons, the witness for the Respondents,
further testified that in the ten years that he was in possession of the land that he made no use of any of the land
between the orchard dear down to the south boundary line
of this own title, except for the use of some coops along the
south side of his own property (Tr. C-17, Line 5-30). (Tr.
C-18, Line 1-8).
In answer to the Appellants as to the ten years that he
supposedly was in possession and ownership of the property
in que3tion and as to whether he had used it or not, he stated
"No, I didn't use it." (Tr. C-18, Line 4-8).
The witness further mentioned that there was a discussion about putting up a fence but that the most that he and
the Appellants discussed on it was as to who was to furnish
material and who was to put the fence in place, and that
there was nothing said as to the exact location of the fence
(Tr. C-18, Lines 9-24).
The witness further testified on re-cross examination,
"No, I didn't use any of it, only the coops." (Tr. RED-REC19, Line 24). The coops were down on the lower part of the
witness's land that didn't conflict with the Appellants' title.
This fact is further borne out by the testimony of Wilbur Harding, another witness for the Respondents, when he
testified "I didn't do very much with any of the property
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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north of the chicken coops, as far as any extensive work."
The question was asked Mr. Harding on cross examination,
"North of the chicken coops, you didn't do much with the
land at all?" Mr. Harding answered, "That is right, except
for the west portion where we had the berries." (Tr. C-131,
Line 11-19). It is to be noted that this witness, that is, Wilbur Harding, shows by his own testimony that he was in
possession of the Emmons land in February of 1942 (Tr.
D-126, Line 28). He further testified that he was on the
land (meaning the Emmons land) for about four years ('I'r.
C-129, Line 3). The use of the land by Mr. Harding, it will
be noted, was little different than the use of the land by Mr.
Emmons. These are the Respondents' own witnesses.
A review of the testimony of the witness, Omel Emmons, who was certainly a witness interested in the behalf
of the Respondents for whom he testified, shows that the
most that the fence amounted to was four or six posts over
the entire length and that the fence was up in some places
and was down in others, and that as far as keeping anything
from traveling back and forth, it wholly failed to do so. His
testimony clearly stated that he didn't do anything with the
land, even that located south of the now disputed area; fOT
a period of ten years he did nothing with the land. This
is the testimony of the immediate predecessor of the Respondents. Add the non-user of Wilbur Harding to the nonuser of Omel Emmons and we have fourteen years of nonuser by the immediate predecessors of the Respondents.
The Respondents filed a suit on April29, 1959, and only
received their conflicting title on March 4, 1959, and the
man that he received it from for the ten years prior to that
time didn't even do anything with the land. There could
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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have been no payment of taxes on the land by witness, Ornel
Emmons, the immediate predecessor of the Respondents,
because his own deeds of record did not conflict with that
of the Appellants, or cover the land in dispute.
The first time the Respondents had anything on the
record which did require a payment of taxes was upon the
recording of the deed of March 4, 1959; thus the witness
Omel Emmons, who had the title for ten years had paid no
taxes on the land in dispute during that period, and he had
made no use of the land, and he has testified of a fence consisting of four to six posts, and a fence that was up and down
in places, and a fence that in no way interferred with traveling back and forth. We submit that, based on the' testimny of Mr. Ornel Emmons, who at least being the so--called
possessor of the land for a period of ten years, should be
a most binding witness on the Respondents.
The Respondents' engineer, Parley M. Neeley, testified
for the Respondents to the effect that a year and a half
prior, he observed two or three posts and he thought there
were two or three stumps, and that the fence wire was lay. ing on the ground for the most part, and that it was from
this observation that he determined that it was an old fence,
(Tr. C-34, Line 25-30) (Tr. C-35, Line 1-11), not that it
was the fence.
Clarence Roundy testified for the Respondents but
could not state with any definiteness as to the condition of
the fence. He presumed that there were wires down but he
could not fix as to how many posts there were and he feU
that two posts would make a fence. That was his memory
as to the condition of the fence in the year 1939 (Tr. C-45,
Line 9-30). The witness further admited that he had sold
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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property which abuts on the east of the property in dispute
to the Respondents (Tr. C-46, Line 9-15).
Darrell Hansen, witness for the Respondents, testified,
"The only fence that I observed, or place that there could
have been any fence was the fence line in question." (Tr. D48, Line 10-11).
In answer to the question by the Respondents' attor-

ney as to what the fence line looked like, he stated, "Well, it
had been burned out but there was still evidence there that
it was a fence. (Tr. D-48, Line 13). And when asked what
the evidence consisted of, he answered, ''Post stubs and wire,
barbed wire." (Tr. D-48, Line 19-22). There was nothing
in the witness's testimony that fixed the location of the
fence; the nearest that the witness fixed the location of the
fence was to say it was the fence line in question (Tr. D-48,
Line 10-11). He made no attempt to locate the fence.
The witness Darrell Hansen certainly has an interest
consistent with the interest of the Respondents in this case,
inasmuch as he is the grantee on a certain deed from the
Respondents. This deed is the first deed that conflicts with
the title description the the Appellants. This is the deed
dated February 16, 1959, and recorded in the office of the
Utah County Recorder on February 16, 1959, book 803,
page 458 (!Defendants' Exhibit No. 4, page 43).
If the Respondents prevail in this action, then too would
witness Darrell G. Hansen prevail because a part of his title
represented by the deed of February 16, 1959, is a part of
the land in dispute. In other words, the witness Darrell
Hansen for the Respondents, if he is to have a g<><Xl title, is
dependent on the fence line being established as claimed by
the Respondents.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

The next witness for the Respondents was Mr. Glen
Farrer, who had taken some pictures of some posts and wire
laying on the ground, and his testimony was directed relative to the fence line running north and south along the
east side of the properties (Tr. C-57, Line 28-30). He too
assumed as to the location of the fence line (Tr. D-58, Line
11-13)
0

The other witness for the Respondents as to the fence
line was Nora Roundy, and she admitted on cross examination that she didn't know much about any of the fence
lines (Tr. C-61, Line 1-11).
The evidence reviewed thus far in this brief is the evidence on which the Respondents sought to acquire title to
land which was outside of any deeded description; that is,
outside of the record title that Respondents had prior to
a deed received immediately preceding the law suit. The
Respondents are seeking to move their north boundary line
north of their deeded line, a distance of approximately
eighty-eight feet. Their own witnesses and evidence shows
at the most, remnants of an old fence completely deteriorated and consisting of stubs of four to six posts. Their evidence does not do any more than show that there was some
sort of an old fence; they do not show any occupancy up to
the fence; their own evidence shows that the immediate
prior grantor to the Respondents did not do anything with
the land at all for a period of ten years. It is difficult for
us to see any claim of right and user that did establish this
so-called fence as the boundary line fence. It is the duty,
as we see it, of the Respondents to do more than simply
show remnants of an old fence.
The witnesses for the Appellants are quite clear and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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definite as to the boundary line between the two properties.
Mr. LeRoy Nielson, one of the Appellants, testified as to
his purchase of the property, and an abstract marked Defendants' Exhibit No. 4, was introduced in evidence. There
was no objection to the introduction of the abstract (Tr.
D--62, line 1-5).
Mr. Nielson testifies as to his first view of the premises and as to the remnants of an old fence line on the south
side of his south title line. He located the south fence line
as being exactly west of a headgate in the irrigation ditch
called the Mott !Ditch (Tr. D-67, Line 15-18). (Tr. RED-90,
Line 20-30) (Tr. D-91, Line 1-8) . He further testified that
at the time the fence had no wire· on it and that there were
four posts standing (Tr. D-67, Line 22-30). He further
testified that the posts remained in place until the fall of
l958, (Tr. D-68, Line 8-10), and that they disappeared after
a housing project was commenced (Tr. D-68, Line 11-25).
The Appellant, LeRoy Nielson, testified as to his south
fence o[ this south title line being in exact line with a fence
line running east and west directly across the street. He
further testified as to his east fence line which commenced
at the north end of his property (Tr. [)~71, Line 1-30)
(Tr. RED-90, Line 20-30) (Tr. D-91, Line 1-8). The strip
of ground referred to by the Appellants is a long narrow
strip of ground between the Appellants' east fence line and
the road. The south boundary line of the long narrow strip
is in exact line with the south boundary line o[ the Appellants' property, as testified to by the Appellant, and is located 7.25 chains south from the beginning point which is
the same course by way of distance south, that the Appellants' deed called for, and is exactly west of the fence line
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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zunning east and west, that is located across the street from
the Appellants' property. The evidence showed that these
were physical monuments now in place and corroborates
the testimony of the Respondents as to the location of the
old fence line that the A.!ppeHants observed when they first
pW"Chased the property. This fence line being a fence running east and west and located approximately sixty feet
south of what the Respondents claimed the boundary line
would be. We note also that there wa:s not any conflict between this boundary line testified to by the Appellants and
the north deed line of the Respondents, until the year 1959,
when the Respondents took a second description from Orne! Emmons. Up until the deed of Ornel Emmons in 1959
the Respondents' predecessors in interest never did have
a deed which conflicted with the Appellants' deed line and
the old fence line on his extreme south side.
We respectfully call to the Court's attention that the
south boundary line of the long narrow strip on the east
lined up exactly with the boundary line claimed by the Appellants as his south boundary line, and was also in exact
line with the old fence line running east and west that lies
immediately across the road from Appellants' property (Tr.
D-71, Line 1-30) (T·r. D-72, Line 1-30) (Tr. RED-90,
Line 20-30) (Tr. D-91, Line 1-8).
The Appellants further testified as to some remnants
of an old fence being located up inside of his property, but
an examination of that testimony will show that the remnants did not constitute a fence (Tr. D-73, Line 1-30) (Tr.
D-74, Line 1-30). The Appellants :further testified as to
his use of the area. Appellant, LeRoy Nielson, testified
as to the separation of his orchard from the pasture by a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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gate, and as to the use he made of the pasture for his horses, the pasture being the disputed area (Tr. D-74, Line 1825). The Appellants further testified as to his payment
of taxes on the property (Tr. D-76, Line 26-30) (Tr. D77, Line 14). We respectfully call the Court's attention to
the fact that until March of 1959, there was not any deed
of ·record that would have required the Respondents to pay
any taxes on the land in dispute, and there was, in fact, a
period of time from 1940 up to the present date, deeds on
record that would require the Appellants to pay taxes on
the land in dispute (Tr. D-76, Line 26-30) (Tr. D-77, Line
6-14).
The Appellants testified as to his use of the entire area
of land and his traveling back and forth over the area (Tr.
rl). 78, Line 16-21) . The Appellants further testified that
there was no question ever raised as to the boundary line
until the Respondents came to the Appellants with a quitclaim deed which Respondents wanted Appellants to sign
(Tr. D-78, Lines 22-30). We note again that Respondents
had no interest of any nature in the lands until 1959.
Carr Greer, licensed civil engineer, testified as a witness
for the Appellants and testified as to the making of a survey record (Tr. D-92, Line 21-30) (Tr. D-93, Line 1-30),
(Tr. D-94, Line 1-30) (Tr. D-95, Line 1-30) (Tr. D-96,
Line 1-30) (Tr. D-97, Line 1-30) (Tr. D-98, Line 1-30)
(Tr. D-100, Dine 1-10).
The results of the survey of Carr Greer were duly set
forth in a plat prepared by Carr Greer, that the plat marked
Defendants' Exhibit No. 5 was offered in evidence andreceived (Tr. C-101, Line 1-9).
The survey plat, Defendants' Exhibit 5, sets forth the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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location of an old fence line that crossed the street and
sets forth the distance called for by the Appellants' deed
and also sets forth the north limit of the original Respondents' deed, which represents a line located twenty-eight feet
south of the south line of the Appellants' deed. The plat also
sets forth the location of the deed line as called for by the
deed of March 4, 1959, that the Respondents received. This
deed and the north line set forth in said deed is the first
conflict in the record title. The plat also sets forth t)le long
narrow strip of ground running north and south along the
east side of the Nielson property, and the south boundary
line of said long narrow strip represented by the southwest
comer of the west fence line of said long narrow ~trip which
is a point directly in line with an old fence line across the
street to the east. The plat also shows the extension of the
new deed of the Respondents extending east to the road
and the using up of a part of the south end of the long narrow strip. The south end of this long narrow strip ~
longed to the Respondents and it represents the piece of
ground conveyed by the Respondents to the witness Darrell Hansen. We submit that the survey corroborates the
testimony of the Appellant LeRoy Nielson.
The other witnesses testifying in behalf of the Appellants were all persons that were well acquainted with the
land in question. In fact, they had been closely associated
with the land. Thy were old residents of the area immediately adjacent to the property in question. Their observations covered a great number of years. They had no
interest of any kind or nature in the outcome of the action
The first of these witnesses was Daniel H. Jorgensen.
He had lived in the area approximately sixty years (Tr. DSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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106, Line 23-30). He testified as to his long acquaintance
to the property in question and to his farming in that area
(Tr. D-107, Line 1-30). Tr. D-108, Line 1-30). He testified
that there was an old fence line that ran west from the
floodgate in the ditch. He testified about the fence line
being in line with the continuation of a fence running east
and west across the street (Tr. D-109, Line 1-30). Mr. Jorgensen also testfied as to the long narrow strip located on
the east side of the property in question but between the
properties and the road (Tr. D-110, Line 1-30) (Tr. D- 111,
Line 1-30) (Tr. D.-112, Line 1-2) (Tr. D-112, Line 8-30).
The testimony of Mary Kirkwood in behalf of the Appellants set forth her long acquaintance with the property
which covered a period of forty years (Tr. D-118, Line 310). Her testimony showed her acquaintance with the
different owners of the property and the different uses of
the property over some forty years of time (Tr. D-118, Line
11-30) (Tr. D-119, Line 1-30). Mary Kirkwood further
testified relative to the south boundary of the Appellants'
property as being at a point running east and west from
the floodgate (Tr. D-119, Line 27-30). Her personal knowledge of the floodgate and the boundary line is attested to
by her testimony as to the type and make of the floodgate
and the many occasions she had to pass by the boundary
line (Tr. D-130, Line 1-30). Her testimony showed the
pasturing use of the land made by the Appellants and predecessors in interest (Tr. D-120, Line 16-30) (Tr. \D-121, Line
1-7). Mary Kirkwood's testimony as to the pasturing of
the horses of George Miller, who was one of the predecessors in interest of the Appellants, is significant to show the
occupancy of the Appellants and his predecessors in interest,
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and it corroborates the testimony in the case as to the location of the old field fence; that is, the south boundary line
of the Appellants, as shown by their deed~
The testimony of Mary Kirkwood shows the use of division fences to separate the pasture from the orchard, and
its relationship to the south boundary line fence of the Appellants (Tr. RED-123, Line 19-30) (Tr. REC- 124, Line
1-8).
Randall Shipley testified in behalf of the Appellants.
His testimony showed that he was an old resident of the
area and that he was well acquainted with the Nielson land
and the Emmons land, his father before him having owned
it (Tr. D-133, Line 16-20) (Tr. C-138, Line 7). Mr. Shipley was of the age of sixty-five years, and he himself had
fanned the land for a period of fifteen years (Tr. D-134,
Line 26) . Randall Shipley testified as to the fence lines on
the property and located as running directly west from the
bottom of the long narrow piece of property that had been
owned by Roundy (Tr. D-135, Line 24-27) (Tr. C-139, Line
7-16) (Tr. D-136, Line 1-24). This is in line with the testimony of Mr. Dan Jorgensen and Mary Kirkwwod (Tr. D109, Line 1-30) (Tr. D-110, Line 1-30) (Tr. D-111, Line
1-30) (Tr. D-112, Line 8-30) (Tr. D. 119, Line 27-30. He
also testified as to two fences on the property: namely, a
fence running east an west which did correspond with the
south boundary line with the description on the Appellants'
deed, (Tr. RED-141, Line 16-24) (Tr. D-142, Line 1-5),
and another fence line further up in the property of Nielson which did correspond with the fence separating the
orchard from the pasture (Tr. D-136, Line 25-30) (Tr. C139, Line 4-16). This testimony corroborates the testimony
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as given by Mary Kirkwood as to the division fences and
the pasturing of horses; particularly the pasturing of the Miller horse referred to above in this brief, (Tr. D-120, Line 2223) , and it also lines up with the testimony of Mr. Nielson
as to the use that he made of the area for his horses.
Attorney for the Respondents, in cross examining Shipley, asked the witness as follows: "Going back now to! want to know if you are able to say with certainty that
there were two parallel fences running east and west across
the Keller property?" (Tr. C-139, Line 30) (Tr. C-140,
Line 1-2.). Mr. Shipley answered: "The way I remember
it there were two fences." (Tr. C-40, Line 3). Further questions by the attorney or the Respondents brought out the
following: Q. "I don't want to know the way you remember
irt; I want to know if you are ~ble to say with absolute certainty under oath that there were two fences running side
})y side, some distance apart, in an east-west direction across
the Keller property? A-That is the way I remember it.
Q-And you would say that under oath? A-Yes." (Tr. C140, Line 4-11).
The testimony of Daniel Jorgensen,. Mary Kirkwood,
Randall Shipley, and Samuel Park, is testimony from witnesses that had long been acquainted with the property.
They were old residents of the area and were closely associated with the property. They had no interest of any kind
Whatsoever in the outcome of the law suit. Their testimony was very clear to the effect that the south boundary
line of the Nielson property ran west from the headgate.
This south boundary line corresponded with the call of the
deed, namely: 7.25 chains south from the beginning point
of the Nielson description, an also lined up with the fence
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line across the street, referred to as the "old field fence"
that continued on west across the headgate before the roadway was put in. The testimony of these witnesses is corroborated by the survey of Mr. Carr Greer. The Respondents did not introduce any survey that fixed the location
of the fence line that they have contended for. The Respondents have not any evidence in the record which locates
land which they are now claiming.
The Respondents who are Plaintiffs in this case apparently have, by the allegations in their complaint, proceeded on two theories: (R. 3-4) 1. Adverse possession,
and, 2. Boundary line by acquiescence.
First, as to the theory of adverse possession, they alleged possession for more than twenty-five years, and that
it was full and exclusive use and occupancy, enclosed by a
fence, and that they paid all taxes levied against said property. The Utah Code Annotated, 1953, entitled 78-12-7,
provides as follows:
"In every action for the recovery of real property,
or the possession thereof, the person establishing a legal
title to the property shall be presumed to have been
possessed tJ1ereof within the time required by law; and
the occupation of the property by any other person shall
be deemed to have been under and in subordination to
the legal title, unless it appears that the property has
been held and possessed adversely to such legal title
or seven years before the commencement of the action."

Under this section, the Appellant, who is the owner of
the record title since 1940, is entitled to the presumption
that all others are deemed to have occupied subordinate to
their title. The burden of proof is on the claimants, the
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Respondents here, to establish their claim. (Ives vs. Grange,
42 Utah 608, 134 Pacific 619) It is their duty to establish
that they have complied with all the necessary elements.
(Spring Creek Irrigation Co. vs. Zollinger, 58 Utah 90, 197
Pacific 737). Their own evidence failed to establish exclusive use and occupancy. The predecessor to their title, towit: Ornel Emmons, admitted that he had done nothing
with the property in question for a period of ten years and
predecessors before him, by their own evidence, did nothing
with the property for four years. The most that they established by their evidence as to the property being enclosed by a fence was that there was the rerrmants and parts
of an old fence. There is not any evidence in the record
at all as to a fence enclosing the property over the entire
width of the property. The testimony spoke of stubs or
parts of four to six posts with the wire up in some places
and down in others. Relative to the question of payment
of taxes, the evidence was undisputed to the effect that
the record title has always been in the Appellants and his
predecessors in interest, and the first time that there was
title on the record at all that would call for payment of taxes
by the Respondent was March 4, 1959; and yet the Respondents allege in their complaint that they and their predecessors have paid all taxes on the property, but until they
had some showing on the record deed, they would not even
have received any notice calling for them to pay any taxes
on the property.
Second, as to the theory of boundary by acquiescence,
it is the duty of the Respondents to establish the boundary
line and it is their duty to establish acquiescence in such
a boundary line. The Respondents here are seeking to move
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their title line farther north by twenty-eight feet, which
would then tal{e their title line up to the south title line of
the Appellant, and then in addition to that, the Respondents seek to move their title line still farther north a distance
of approximately sixty feet beyond the title line of the Appellants, mak:ing a total distance of eighty-eight feet that
they seek to move their title line farther north. The theory of the law in Utah as to boundary line by acquiescence
is treated by an artide in the Utah Law Revie·w, Volume
3, No. 4, page 504-516. We submit that a re,view of the
evidence which we have endeavored to do in the forepart of
this brief was that there was not an occupation by the Appelants and their predecessors up to a visible line marked
definitely by a fence, but rather that the land was not even
occupied by the Appellants. We submit that the evidence
does not show anything by way of acquiescence by either
of the parties in any such a line as claimed by the Respondents. The most that the Respondents even attempted to do
in their evidence was to show remnants of an old fence.
They did not establish any acquiescence in such a fence.
The closest the evidence got to such an acquiescence was
where the parties talked about constructing a fence and as
to who would furnish the material and who would place it,
but nothing was said as to where. There was clear evidence
in behalf of the Appellants that the remnants of a fence was
an old division fence dividing Appellants' orchard from their
pasture land. The length of time of any type of acquiescense is rebutted by Appellants own witnesses as to the fact
of doing nothing with the property for a period of fourteen
years. There is an entire absence of any agreement by the
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ary line dispute. The evidence produced by the Appellants,
we feel clearly established the boundary line fence as being
located on line with the south boundary line of the title description of the Appellants. The Appellants' evidence from
impartial and unbiased witnesses having a long acquaintance
and thorough knowledge of the property, in our opinion,
refuted any evidence of the Respondents as to boundary by
acquiescence. We feel that the duty of the Respondents is
to establish more than a mere statement that there was remnants of an old fence. We believe that the most favorable
construction of the evidence in behalf of the Respondents
would be to say that they showed that there was remnants
of an old fence; it would not show that it was a boundary
line fence and that it had been acquiesced by the parties.
CONCLUSION

We respectfully submit that based on the evidence introduced at the trial and the application of the law thereto, that the evidence was insufficient to justify the findings
of fact and conclusions of law and decree quieting title.
Respectfully submitted,

HV.WENTZ,
Attorney for Defendants
and Appellants
75 East Center,
Provo, Utah
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